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Abstract

This paper is intended to address the situation facing a high school graduate
whose name is called in the annual Major League Draft in the month of June. The
work will begin with an introduction that states the problem at hand along with
background information. It will then progress into an overview of facts and fmancial
figures about minor league baseball and about a college education. Following these
sections will be the main emphasis of the paper: detailing the dilemma of whether or
not to sign a professional contract without attending college. This will be done by
showing the expected present values of both options for the players based on the
round in which they are drafted along with the potential investment of the signing
bonuses and salaries. Some other possible pros and cons of signing a contract
immediately will also be examined. This predicament will be considered from the
perspective of five different cross sections of draftees. Groups will be divided into
players drafted in the following rounds: ftrSt, second through fifth, sixth through
fifteenth. sixteenth through thirtieth. and thirty-first through fiftieth. A look at the
fortunate few who reach the majors will follow this section. Then. a few players who

were faced with this decision will be addressed by considering their choice and
current status. Finally. conclusions and recommendations about the signing decision
will be made.
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Introduction

The Major League Baseball draft which occurs annually in early June is without
a doubt a joyous occasion for all those players talented and fortunate enough to fmd
themselves selected by one of the twenty--eight teams. Having one's name called in
any of the draft's fifty rounds signifies a reward for all of the hours of diligent work
and practice that a high caliber athlete most likely would have endured by the age of
eighteen. For many players and their families, though, being drafted begins a
diffICUlt period of time in which several crucial questions must be answered.
The source of the aforementioned difficulty can be found in this problem:
weighing the advantages and disadvantages of immediately beginning a professional
career against those of sharpening one's baseball skills while also receiving an
education at the college level. Although this decision alone can cause suffICient
confusion, the constant pressures of player agents, team scouts, and college recruiters
and coaches often further dilute the key issue of what is best for each particular player
and his family.
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Facts of Minor League Baseball

Over a fifteen year period beginning in 1975 and ending in 1990,44.47% of
high school players who were drafted came to the conclusion that bypassing a college
career and education in favor of the professional ranks was the proper choice
(Simpson, 1990, p. 6). Due to the fact that only four of the 2593 high school players
drafted during this period of time found themselves being promoted directly to the big
league, there exists about a 99.85 % chance that a player will spend an amount of time
in professional baseball's minor leagues before reaching the top (Simpson, 1990, p.
7). Throwing in the fact that not one senior has gone directly from hometown hero to

major league rookie since 1978 lends even more support to the claim that
organizations do not want to rush their top players along as quickly as they might
have in the past. Taking these figures into account, a player thinking about choosing
professional ball over college might make a more informed decision knowing some
facts about the minor leagues.
Five levels of professional minor league baseball exist in the current system.
Single A ball contains three separate levels of its own: low (short season) A, middle
A, and high A. Double A and triple A round out the five divisions. The average
high school signee who eventually reaches the major league will spend 6.2 years
toiling in the minors (Simpson, 1990, p.9). Unless a player is chosen in a round high
enough to merit a substantial signing bonus and good odds of reaching the majors,
immediate professional baseball would not be considered a lucrative venture by most
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standards. Only when a player reaches double A or triple A does he begin to earn
money which might be sufficient for investment purposes if the player is single or to
begin support of a family if the player is married. At the lower levels of the minors,
compensation is paid out to the players in modest sums.
The entry level into professional baseball for the vast majority of high school
seniors who choose to forego a college career is rookie ball, otherwise known as short
season low A. The" short season" name comes from the fact that the season' s games
do not begin until the middle of June after the draft has been completed. This allows

most players willing to sign a gratuitous period in order to complete their respective
negotiations.
The low A rookie season lasts from its inception in June until its conclusion in
early September. Several leagues of this level exist, with teams playing
approximately seventy games apiece. During this nearly three month period of time,
players can expect to be paid on a monthly basis at a preset rate. At the present time,
that previously mentioned rate is $850 per month paid in two installments on the first
and fifteenth of each month (Major League Baseball Players' Association). Due to
the fact that no compensation is received by players during the off season at the single
A level, payment is pro-rated to the number of days in the month that the player is
employed during months that are not fully consumed by baseball (Minor League
Uniform Player Contract, 1992).
Players can expect to fmd a rather difficult set of circumstances awaiting them in
rookie baseball. Since the monthly salary is somewhat small, players are often forced
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to live with several roommates in modest accommodations. Leagues may field teams

which lie several hours apart, thus requiring long day and night travel. Short season
is the lowest level of professional baseball, and its travel conditions reflect the lack of

fmances that most major league clubs allow to their respective low A subsidiaries.
Players usually are placed in hotel rooms in groups of four after spending countless
hours on buses that are crowded and often without air conditioning or bathroom
facilities. Players do receive from the club a small per diem amount of money for all
days that the team is playing away from its home park. The current minimum amount
is fifteen dollars at the rookie level (Minor League Uniform Player Contract, 1992).

The next step on the progression to the big league for most professional baseball
players is one of the middle A leagues. Seasons at this level are much greater in
duration than are those at the low A level. In March, training camp opens for most
players competing at this level. After spending about three weeks practicing and
playing exhibition contests, the official championship season begins in April. Middle
A schedules contain 144 games that are played from April until late August when
each respective league's playoffs begin.
Conditions for players at the middle A level are not much different than those at
low A. Team funding is stin paltry, resulting in continuing quadruple-occupancy in
hotels on road trips. The per diem amount of fifteen dollars also goes unchanged.
The most notable change for the players is the fact that the season, including training

camp. lasts for over six months. While this creates a much greater mental grind for
each individual athlete, it also results in the receiving of approximately six more
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paychecks per year than a low A player receives. Middle A players are paid a flat
salary of $950 per month (Major League Baseball Players' Association), and the
disbursement of checks remains on the same system as is utilized in low A baseball.
One step up from middle A baseball is the high A level. A player's season
duration and schedule at this level do not differ greatly than those of middle A
players, beginning with spring training in March and ending in August or September
some 144 to 160 games later. The largest change between middle and high A
baseball is the money available to most teams. While many major league clubs will
control several subsidiaries at the low A and middle A levels, most teams have only
one or two high A clubs. This results in the ability to travel more comfortably with
respect to the mode of transportation and the type of accommodations. Minimum per
diem allowances remain at the fifteen dollar amount (though most teams pay more at
this level), and salaries jump to $1100 a month received on a semi-monthly basis
(Major League Baseball Players' Association).
Double A baseball is the next level to be mastered following the single A leagues
on a player's way to the major leagues. Double A's season is yet another falling into
the 144 to 160 game length spanning a period of about six months. Players are
treated well without being pampered during a stint in double A. Stadiums are usually
larger and more modem than their single A counterparts, and this is a direct reflection
of more money being available to the clubs. Each big league club possesses only one
team at the double and triple A levels, thus allowing them to focus on their respective
farm clubs. While playing on the road, accommodations are double occupancy, and
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the per diem minimum allowance is twenty dollars. Salaries increase by about 40%
and become slightly more flexible when a player reaches double A, falling somewhere
between $1500 and $1650 per month (Major League Baseball Players' Association).
The amount to be paid is determined by each individual organization. Players also
have a choice of the way in which they will be compensated for the first time. The
bimonthly system remains intact during the season, but players may elect to receive
smaller checks each payment period in order to stretch their salaries over the entire
calendar year as opposed to only being paid while playing.
While a few minor leaguers leap directly from double A into the major league,
most must move through at least one triple A season. For the most part, triple A
players are treated very well. Clubs are often located in moderately large cities
capable of generating quality crowd support, and facilities and travel arrangements are
first rate. The players' per diem money rises to thirty dollars, and salaries again see a
healthy increase. Just as in double A, clubs are given freedom to determine the
amount that they wish to pay players of their triple A afflliates. Salary amounts can
range anywhere from $1800 to $2000 per month (Major League Baseball Players'
Association). Players also keep the option of spreading payments over the calendar
year or being paid strictly during the season.
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Facts of a College Education

For the vast majority of the approximately 55 % of baseball players who elect not
to sign after being drafted in the first June following their high school graduations, a

college baseball career and education most likely await. While these years allow the
player to mature mentally and physically with respect to baseball, they also provide
the person with a college degree that will remain long after his athletic endeavors
have come to a close.
It is a most safe assumption that a high school baseball player whose skills allow
him to be drafted by a professional organization also will be offered an athletic
scholarship by one or more collegiate institutions. In this day and age of non-revenue

sports (most likely including baseball) in intercollegiate athletics, though, a
scholarship does not necessarily cover all costs of an education. Only 11.7
scholarships are available to a baseball team which will likely have around thirty
members. The top three to five players might be receiving full or nearly full
scholarships while the next twelve to fifteen players usually divide the remaining six
to seven scholarships amongst themselves. The fmal members of a college team

consist of invited walk-ons and walk-ons taken from try-outs each fall.
A freshman college baseball player who did not sign when drafted will most
likely begin his career on a 60 % or better scholarship with the ~portunity to increase
that amount each year that he plays for the school. While this is a substantial amount
of aid, some costs might fall back onto the player and his family. The size of these
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excess costs can differ greatly depending on the size and type of university involved.
Since scholarship athletes are not allowed to hold jobs during their championship
seasons, the money required for whatever might be uncovered by the scholarship must
come either from need-based ftnancial aid, a scholarship program of a non..athletic
nature, or family support. Although family support is not feasible for everyone,
financial aid is often available to those players whose family is unable to give
adequately to cover the expenses not included in a partial athletic scholarship.
The athletic scholarship is providing an education to those players receiving them
that is a more valuable tool than it has ever been in the past. It is becoming
increasingly important in the modem workplace for a potential employee to possess a
college bachelor's degree at the bare minimum. For players who feel that college is
the correct route, receiving an education allows them to increase their own
marketability in the most likely event that their baseball career will conclude in the
minor leagues without ever reaching the majors.
The first issue facing a college graduate is securing employment worthy of his or
her credentials. Projections released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics concerning the
job market between the years of 1992 and 2005 show an average of 1.4 million

potential entrants into the labor force each year while only 1.05 million jobs requiring
college educations are expected to be available (Shelley, 1994, p. 9). Based on these
figures, it is obvious that competition for these positions will be fterce among recent
college graduates. These statistics also indicate that, due to this competition,
approximately 2S % of these graduates will be forced to accept employment not

11
requiring a college degree. This fact does not bode well for those workers possessing
only a high school diploma since they will more often than ever fmd themselves going
head to head with college graduates for positions once held mostly by employees
without a college education. The Bureau of Labor Statistics calculated an 8%
unemployment rate for high school graduates in 1992 compared to a 3 % rate for
holders of a college degree (Shelley, 1994, p. S). It can be logically inferred based
on the aforementioned statistics that the gap between the numbers will grow between
1995 and 2005, placing even more importance on the possession of a college
education when seeking employment.
The paramount importance of earning a college degree in order to find a job also
carries over into the potential earnings one can expect with the degree as compared to
what is often earned without a college education. According to a study performed in
1993 by the Economic Policy Institute, workers in possession of college degrees
earned on the average 58 % more income than their counterparts whose education
ended in high school. That represents a substantial increase from the 38 % wage gap
between these two cross-sections of employees that existed in 1979 (Greenhouse,
1993, p. Dl). The situation at hand does not exist because college graduates are
earning much more than they traditionally have, but because high school graduates are
earning much less than in the past. College educated males falling between the ages
of 2S and 54 realized a 7 % increase in net income during the decade beginning in
1979 and ending in 1989. Although this increase does not appear tremendous, it
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compares most favorably with the 11 % drop in earnings that this group of men with
a high school education felt during the same period of time (Kristof, 1992, p.D7).
When examined on a monthly, yearly, and lifetime income basis, the outlook for
workers without a college degree continues to look bleak when placed up against that
of the degree holder. The 1992 average earnings of over age 25 male employees in
possession of only a high school education was $2156 per month and $28,043 per
year as determined by the U.S. Department of Education. In comparison, the same
age group of college graduates earned $3713 monthly and $44,554 per annum
(Kristof, 1992, p. 02). To further illustrate this discrepancy, a Census Bureau report
released on July 21, 1994 indicated that a high school graduate's average lifetime
earnings will total $821,000 while those of a person in possession of some sort of
bachelor's degree will reach $1,421,000. Taking the illustration a step further, a
person holding a professional degree should see his or her lifetime earnings reach an
amount near $3,013,000 (Lee, 1994, p. 01). Consideration of these comparisons
might make a college baseball career and education a more attractive option to a high
school player who is not sure whether to sign professionally or attend college.
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The SigDiDg Question

Having one's name called in the Major League Baseball Amateur Draft each

June is a reward for any college or high school baseball player. The respective
decisions facing the college draftee and the high school draftee, though, are most
different. For the college draftee, most likely a junior in eligibility, this selection in
the draft represents the last time that he will have any bargaining power with a club
since he will be a senior during the next draft. This makes the choice much simpler
for the college player, often becoming only a question of player and organization
reaching a signing bonus amount and contract that are agreeable to both parties. In the
case of the high school player who is chosen in the first round, the choice is not quite
as clearly dermed. Many non-rmancial factors enter the equation which are not
evident for a college player. A high school draftee might be influenced by family
rmancial status, ability to compete in other sports, or insecurity about personal
intelligence. Regardless of the factors involved in the decision, it is most likely that
finances will not be the single consideration for the drafted high school player.
For the purpose of comparing the financial situations of players falling into
different categories in the draft based on the number of the round in which they are
chosen. two different investment rates will be utilized. The two investment strategies
will be a risk-free investment rate, represented by a five year average of the three
month T-bill, and by an index fund return, represented by a ten year average of the
S&P 500. As reported in the Markets Diary section of the Wall Street 10urnal in the
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October 20 week of each year. the 1991-1995 average T-bill rate is 4.25 % while the
1986-1995 S&P 500 rate is 11.06%. For the investment rate in the expected present
value calculations, an average of these two rates, 7.655 %, will be utilized, and the
T-bill rate will serve as both the discount rate and the growth rate.
The expected present value calculations for each specifIC draft category of both
signing immediately and attending college can be found in tables 2-11 of the appendix
with the ftnal results located in table 1. Each table begins by designating its
respective draft category and signing decision at the top of the chart. The far left
columns indicate player age and time into the player's career. In the tables where the
decision is to sign a professional contract immediately. the signing bonus is received
at time 0, and the fIrst years of the calculations show actual minor league earnings
along with the value of those earnings at time O. The next columns indicate that one
of two things has occurred. The left side column entitled -No Majors- indicates the
percentage of draftees who never compete in the majors, and it depicts their earnings.
The salaries they receive in the minors trying to reach the majors are summed
underneath the actual amounts at their time 0 totals. The right hand column with the
heading -Majors - shows the percentage of players reaching the majors along with
future earnings for those players. The average major leaguer spends 6.8 seasons
playing at the highest level, and this column reveals the value of his average earnings
in the majors at time 0 (Martin, 1994, p. 12). Both sections follow with an
illustration of regular job earnings at the conclusion of the baseball career. The
players who do not reach the majors are given the average salary of a high school
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graduate, $28,043, carried out until retirement at age 65. Those who do make it are
allotted an extra 25 % on top of the normal amount due to increased marketability

gained by being a major league athlete. The total of these annual salaries at time 0 is

indicated under the amount of each year's pay. Combining the signing bonus, minor
league salary, regular job salary, and either the additional minor league money or the
major league salary (depending on whether the player reaches the majors) produces a
sum of all earnings figure for each column. Multiplying these sums by the probability
of each respective occurrence (located next to the ItNo Majors or "Majors· column
lt

headings) creates the PVl and PV2 amounts. Adding these two numbers gives a
player his expected present value of signing a professional contract, located at the

bottom of each table.
The tables depicting the decision to attend college are slightly more complicated
than those of Signing out of high school. The top of the page shows time 0-3 with

earnings of O. These are the college years. Under this, separate left and right hand
columns can again be found, and they are entitled •After College It. On the left is a
column assuming that the player is drafted after college in a similar or higher round
than he was chosen after high school. The right hand column assumes that the player

falls to a lower position in the draft. The chances of each of these scenarios are
indicated in parentheses. Both columns begin with actual and time 0 minor league
salaries and their totals. They then move to the same situation as previously occurred
in the tables showing immediate signing. Each column experiences its own internal
split under the headings -No Majors" and -Majors". The earnings of career minor
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leaguers again are on the left while the major leaguers are on the right. Each player' s
time 0 baseball earnings are directly under the actual salaries. The players who fall
short of the majors are given the average college graduate salary of $44,554 per year
while those who make it are again given a 25 % increase over that number due to
endorsement potential. These salaries are carried out to age 65 and then discounted
back to time O. Signing bonus, baseball salaries, and regular job salaries again

constitute the sum of earnings cell. Each sum of earnings cell is followed by a cell
showing that same sum of earnings amount multiplied by the percentage of players
applying to that number (indicated beside the "No Majors" or "Majors" heading).
These two amounts in each column are then summed and multiplied by the percentage
of players falling into their respective columns (indicated at the top of each column
beside either the "Rounds" or the "Later Pick" heading) to attain the PV3 and PV4
figures.
Located under the left band column in tables 3,5,7, and 9 and in the right
column in table 11 are the figures for the player who chooses to attend coUege and is
not drafted after his collegiate career. He is given the average college graduate

annual salary until age 65 when he retires. The sum of these salaries at time 0 is then
multiplied by 11 % to attain the PV5 figure. This is because 11 % of players drafted
out of high school are not chosen again after college (Simpson, 1990. p. 20).
At the bottom right of the tables showing calculations for players attending
college can be seen the sum of the PV3, PV4, and PV5 amounts. This is in the form
of the expected present value of attending college.

17
Table 1 of the appendix shows the fInal PV's and the expected present value
(EPV) of signing for each draft category at the top of the chart. These are followed
by the same numbers for each category based on attending college. The fInal row on

the chart indicates the most crucial numbers of the entire present value analysis.
These are the EPV's of signing minus the EPV's of attending college. Each single
amount allows a draftee falling into any of the categories to see one number
encompassing bonuses, baseball salaries, and regular job salaries factored in with his
chances of reaching the majors based on previous players in a similar situation. A
much more informed signing decision can be made with this information.
Some additional numbers that could assist a player with his decision are potential
investment amounts. The United States Department of Labor Consumer Expenditure
Survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides a figure for a baseline
amount of the after tax bonus and salary available for investment purposes. The 1991
survey concluded that single males falling into the highest income bracket have
average annual expenditures of 76.09% of income after taxes, leaving 23.9%
available for potential saving or investment (Consumer Expenditure Survey t 1993, p.
174). Single males who earn $30,000-39,999 per year have 8.61 % of disposable
income available for investment, while those falling into the $20,000-29,999 have
only 2.41 % to save (Consumer Expenditure Survey, 1993, p. 174). Those earning
less than $20,000, on the average, spend more than they earn. Another possible
beginning point for investment comes from The Statistical Abstract of the United
States, which shows that over a four year period from 1990 to 1993, the average
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American set aside 4.575 % of personal disposable income for saving. It is highly
possible, though, that a player receiving a six-digit lump sum does not immediately
need 76% of the money to subsist and is not representative of an "average" American.

Due to this fact, other investment options for the first round draft choice will be
considered along with the previously mentioned baseline figures. Examining the
potential investments of the draftees at the risk-free and index fund rates will be
broken down into amounts based upon the figures attained from the government
publications along with two arbitrary amounts. It is very possible that a player will
not instantly need a large portion of his bonus, and thus could invest a much larger
amount than 23.9%. Therefore, investment sums of 50% and 75% of the after tax
signing bonus will also be included.
The aforementioned investment amounts placed in funds earning either the risk~
free T-bill rate or the S&P 500 index rate over four years can be seen for each draft
category on page 12 of the appendix. The after tax signing bonus available for
investment in each draft category is shown above each set of amounts. Investment
amounts are based on the column headings, beginning with the Statistical Abstract and
Consumer Expenditure Survey figures, and ending with the two arbitrary amounts.
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'!be First Round Draft Choice
The decision facing one of the fortunate twenty-eight players fmding themselves
chosen in the first round of the Major League Baseball Amateur Draft each June is
academic in many cases. For the college player, this opportunity represents the
largest signing bonus he will ever be offered. The only question remaining in his
mind most likely involves the size of his signing bonus. For the high school senior
chosen in the first round, the size of his signing bonus is also important for the
immediate choice. In the late 1980's and early 1990's, the signing bonuses of high
draft picks grew at a rapid pace, causing these players to consider potential first round
money three years down the road when they could be drafted as college juniors while

deciding whether or not to sign a professional contract immediately after high school.
In 1989, signing bonuses for first round choices averaged $176,239.13 with the

Baltimore Orioles' number one overall pick, Ben McDonald, receiving $350,000
(Simpson, 1990, p. 296). Just two years later. Oakland's Todd Van Poppel, the ftrSt
overall choice, saw his signing bonus rocket upwards over 250% to $1,250,000 while
the average first round pick settled for an increase of around 125 % over the 1989
average to $396,229.81 (Major League Baseball Players' Association). In the 1993
draft. first round choices again saw their fortunes increase by a sizable margin over
the 1991 numbers. Number one pick Alex Rodriguez of the Seattle Mariners
negotiated fiercely with threats to attend the University of Miami on a football
scholarship, and for his efforts he received the largest bonus to date, $2,150,000.
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The remaining flfSt round picks fared well, seeing the average money rise
approximately 100% from the 1991 totals to $774,833.26 (Major League Baseball
Players' Association).
Assuming that the increases in bonus money will continue at the pace illustrated
by the previous examples would be dangerous since the bonus explosion only began in
1988 after signing bonuses had increased at a minimal rate from the draft's inception
in 1965. For example, the first overall draft choice in 1965 signed for a bonus of
$104,000 while the number one pick in 1987 received $160,000, a relatively minimal
increase considering the twenty-two year time span (Simpson, 1990, p. 21; p. 270).
It is likely that bonuses will continue to rise, but at a much more controlled rate than
has been evident in the previous six to eight years. Based on the statistics of the last

four drafts for which complete numbers are available (1992-1995), a declining rate of
increase in average signing money has been evident. In 1992, average first round
bonus money was $602,185.47, a 51.98% increase from 1991. The average bonus
rose 28.67% to $774,833.26 in 1993, and then rose only 9.67% to $849,726.55 in
1994. With an average signing bonus of $878,360.91 in 1995, first round draftees
only saw an increase of 3.37 % over their 1994 counterparts (Major League Baseball
Players' Association).
Although each player chosen in the first round of the draft undoubtedly feels that
he has the physical and mental tools to eventually reach the majors, the fact is that all

will not reach that ultimate goal. Based on statistics attained from each amateur draft
from 1975 until 1989, a first round choice has a 63.3% chance of playing in the
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Majors at some point in his career (Simpson, 1990, p. 131-307) This is a percentage
that could cause a first round draft choice to lean towards signing immediately.
Another of the most obvious factors that push the high school first round draft

choice to sign a professional contract is the signing bonus. This becomes especially
true when a player considers what the money can do for him if invested properly.
The 1995 June Major League Baseball Amateur Draft saw first round choices who
signed contracts receive an average of $878,360.91 as a Signing bonus (Major League
Baseball Players' Association). Assuming these bonuses fall into normall99S
marginal tax rates, a player will be left with an after tax bonus of $550,393.49 after
paying 39.6% on all money earned above $256.500 (Murphy. 1995, p. A2).
While the money that a first round draft choice receives is much higher than that
of players falling later in the selection process, another factor aiding fll'St round picks
is evident. Although the salary of minor leaguers is similar if not identical across the
league, the contracts held by players trying to reach the major leagues can be most
different. Players chosen in the first round are often able to negotiate important
incentives and bonuses into their contracts. This is a luxury that does not extend
deeply into the draft. One player might want to be guaranteed a call to the majors by
a certain date while another might ask for specific performance based monetary
incentives. Any high school player rmding himself drafted in the first round can also
be sure that he will receive a contractual guarantee providing college education money
from the drafting organization. Regardless of what each player might consider
important to his own situation, being chosen in the first round makes the likelihocxi of
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negotiating a personally favorable contract much greater than it is for those players
chosen much later in the draft.
A final factor that might influence a high school fIrst round draft choice to sign a
professional contract is the situation facing him should his baseball career fail. First
of aU, if he has made any sort of intelligent investment with his signing bonus and
salary money that he received during his career, a first round draft choice can be
secure for a few years after the baseball career comes to a close regardless of whether
or not he has begun his own family. This allows time to search for employment
without feeling undue fmancial strain. The investment returns, coupled with the
organization's contractual obligation to fund a college education, also could allow a
player to pursue his schooling at the highest level at little or no cost to himself or his
family.

The SecoDd Through Fifth Round Draft Choice

High school seniors chosen in the second through fifth rounds of the June
Major League Baseball Amateur draft fmd themselves in a predicament not unlike
that of the first round pick. They must weigh the advantages of a six figure signing
bonus and a guaranteed college education against potential upward mobility in the
draft. These choices must again be made while being pressured from all sides by

family, professional scouts, and college recruiters.
One consideration that is not as favorable to drafted players falling into this
category as opposed to their first round counterparts is the chance of reaching the
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major leagues. Analyzing the second round through fifth round draft choices over the
fifteen year period of 1975 through 1989, it can be seen that 35.8% of these players
reached the majors during their professional careers (Simpson, 1990, 131-307).
While players falling into this draft category again might assume that being a top draft
choice guarantees that they possess all the needed skills in order to excel, they cannot
deny that 64.2 % of players in the same position in the past did not ever set foot in a

Major League stadium as a competitor.
The signing bonus is a factor that will again exert heavy pressure on the drafted
player. The first type of push is in the immediate gain. Those athletes falling into
the second through fifth rounds in 1995 received an average bonus of $231,258.76

(Major League Baseball Players' Association). Taxing this bonus at normal marginal
1995 rates leaves an after tax amount of $158,635.11 after paying 36% on all
earnings above $117,950 (Murphy. 1995, A2).
While this is substantial money, the potential signing bonus also pressures the
high school player to attend college and test the draft waters at a later date. Although
the bonuses are not increasing at the rate of the late 1980's, a second through fifth
round choice has the chance of moving to a higher round or position in the draft and
possibly earning a larger signing bonus.
Another area that second through fifth round draft choices might fmd
advantageous is their contract negotiations. This cross section of the draft is still high
enough to carry some heavy clout to the bargaining table when it comes time to reach
an agreement on a contract for the player. The ability to demand incentives and
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guaranteed calls to the majors is not equal to that of draftees from the first round, but
a high school player in this draft category most definitely will have a guaranteed
college education included in the conditions of his agreement to sign a contract.
In the event that a player from this draft segment is one of the 64.2 % who are

not fortunate enough to reach the majors, the outlook is not likely to be bleak.
Returns from proper investment of a portion of the signing bonus could be sufficient
to provide income while he pursues his education at the expense of the organization.

The earnings should also furnish support for a player and, if he is married, his family,

while he actively searches for employment. These factors allow a player who falls
short of the majors to keep his options open upon his retirement from baseball.

The Sixth Through Fifteenth Round Draft Choice
Athletes who fJDd themselves chosen anywhere between the sixth and fifteenth
rounds of the Major League draft face a most diffICult decision when weighing the
pros and cons of signing a professional contract immediately or attending college.
The bonus offered to them will be sizable, but the potential to move forward in the
draft is also evident. Some of the advantages of being a high pick will be offered to
these draftees while some of the disadvantages of being a low pick will have to be
endured.

If one's odds of playing in the majors are an important factor in the signing
decision, then drafted players in this category might want to choose the college route.
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Based on statistics from the 1975 to 1989 drafts, 15.4% of sixth through fifteenth

round choices reached the big leagues while a sizable 84.6% spent a career toiling in
the minors (Simpson, 1990, p. 131-307). These ominous numbers head a list of
several ambiguous factors facing draftees in this category.
The signing bonus for draft picks from the sixth through fifteenth rounds is not
the massive six..<figit sum that the highest rounds receive, but it remains a formidable
amount. In the 1995 draft, players from this set of rounds earned an average of
$58,162.19 as a signing bonus (Major League Baseball Players' Association). After
paying 31 % in taxes on all earnings above $56,550 as specified in the 1995 marginal
tax rates, the remaining sum is $44,863.91 (Mutphy. 1995, A2).

Even though the lure of this money is powerful to most teenagers, a player
talented enough to be chosen in one of these rounds must consider his potential for
upward mobility. While it is always possible that an athlete who chooses not to sign
will be drafted in a later position the next time around, these draftees must also
contemplate forgoing the short term gain for the feasible greater long term profit.
For the draftee chosen in the sixth through fifteenth rounds, the contract is a
difficult item to categorize. Some players may be able to negotiate well and receive a
great percentage of the items they hope to have included in their respective contracts.
Others, however, will not bargain as effectively and will not have contracts full of
incentives and guarantees as do players chosen in earlier rounds. This can be seen in
that many players falling into this draft classification will have a guaranteed college
education in their professional contract while others will not be as fortunate.
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Depending on the particular athlete, the contract might be a great asset or simply a
governing document for the player who falls into this cross section of the draft.
For sixth through fifteenth round picks, it is a fact that nearly 85 % of the players
will not play in the majors. If a player from this portion of the draft who signs
immediately out of high school is a member of this majority, he could fmd himself
facing less than ideal circumstances at the close of his career. Only those who receive
college money from their organizations and sensibly invest a large portion of their
signing bonus will not be facing an uphill battle should baseball fail to produce.
Unfortunately, those who do not negotiate for college money will find it difficult to
attend school should they fall short of the majors. Immediate fmancial need is one
factor that could force the retiring player to work without having the opportunity to
earn a degree. The lack of higher education likely will prove costly in the long run to
the players unable to attain it.

The Sixteenth Through Thirtieth Round Draft Choice
Draftees chosen in the sixteenth through thirtieth rounds in the Major League
Baseball Amateur Draft each June are members of the first draft category whose
circumstances seem to point strongly towards accepting the college education. Only a
select few will be able to negotiate for a high signing bonus or for a favorable
contract, but the lure of making it big and attaining a quick profit will always be
suffICient to push some athletes into signing immediately.
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Any player who chooses to sign as a draft pick from one of these rounds will be
beating some powerful odds if he is ever able to compete in the major leagues. A
look at the drafts over the fifteen year period of 1975 to 1989 reveals that only 7.2%

of the players falling into those rounds actually reached the majors during their
careers (Simpson, 1990, p. 131-307). Even the most confident of athletes must agree
that having a 92.8% chance of falling short of one's ultimate goal is an inauspicious
manner in which to begin pursuit of that objective.
Sixteenth through thirtieth round selections can still expect to receive a five digit
signing bonus, though only about half of what sixth through fifteenth rounders
receive. The 1995 draft saw an average bonus for this category of the draft as being
$24,060.37 (Major League Baseball Players' Association). This amount requires the
recipient to pay 28% in taxes on all earnings above $23,350 according to 1995
marginal tax rates (Murphy, 1995, A2). Doing this will leave $20,359.47 available
to the player for use at his own discretion. Although this amount might again seem
like a tremendous sum to some high school draftees, they must take into account the
fact that they have much potential to move forward in the draft at a later date. If the
players and their families will keep this fact in mind, the notion of turning down
thousands of dollars seems much more rational. This rationality is further
strengthened considering that the player will receive a college education in the
meantime.
While the potential immediate gain from signing for the sixteenth through
thirtieth round draft selections is not as persuasive as it is for earlier draft picks, the
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contract by which they can expect to be governed will probably be even less
favorable. Only the fortunate players in this cross section of the draft will bargain
and receive any special clauses or incentives in their contracts. Some players with
undue bargaining power will negotiate to receive college money in their contracts, but
most of these draftees will be faced with footing the bills should higher education be
in their post-baseball plans. This will be diffICUlt if the player begins his own family
during his professional career and does not invest a substantial portion of his signing
bonus at a high interest rate. Should the sixteenth through thirtieth round selection be
one of the nearly 93 % of his kind who complete baseball as a career minor leaguer,
there could exist a diffICult quest for comfort after his retirement.

The Thirty-First Through Fiftieth RoUlld Choice
The fInal category of draftees is those whose name is called somewhere in the

last twenty rounds. Most of the factors that pressured earlier draft picks to consider
signing will exert the opposite force on these athletes. A relatively small signing
bonus, a contract with few incentives, and tremendous odds against success are items
that players in this section of the draft can expect to receive.
A player's chance of reaching the majors being selected in the latest category of
the draft is definitely stacked against him. Of the drafted players from rounds thirtyone to fIfty during the period of 1975 to 1989, only 1.8% advanced to the major
leagues during their careers (Simpson, 1990, p. 131-307). These are not the most
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favorable of odds for a player to be challenging, especially considering that the
financial incentive to do so will be minimal in the long run.
Although a player in this last category of the draft can expect a five digit signing
bonus just as the draftees in the previous two classifications received, the sum hovers
just above four digit status. In 1995, players chosen in rounds thirty-one through fifty
were paid an average bonus of $14,259.41 (Major League Baseball Players'
Association). According to 1995 marginal tax rates, these athletes must pay 15% of
this amount, leaving $12,120.50 for their own personal usage (Murphy, 1995. A2).
While it is undeniable that this money would be beneficial to anyone, it is also certain
that high school players who are drafted in this last category can only see their draft
status improve if they choose to attend college and become eligible for the draft at a
later date. A slight chance that they will not be drafted again does exist, but, since
the inception of the draft in 1965. 89.2 % of the high school seniors who have decided
not to sign professionally at their first opportunity have been chosen again in future
drafts (Simpson, 1990, p.20).
While signing bonuses for players in the last draft category are of little long term
benefit, the contracts offered to the draftees are often worse. A player receiving
anything but the Uniform Minor League Player Contract is fortunate. Most athletes
carry little or no bargaining power as a draftee from a late round, and they are usually

extended few special offers from the drafting organization. For these players, their
negotiations may consist of "take it or leave it- proposals from the club.
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The lack of a substantial signing bonus and contractual guarantees deposit a
retiring member of the 98.2 % of the drafted players from this category who fall short

of the majors in a potentially difficult scenario. Little if any money will likely remain
from the initial signing bonus, making a college education fmancially challenging. In

the event that a player has started his own family, the time for further schooling may
not be available. These factors combine to create unfavorable conditions that could
face a player from this draft position at the close of his career.

Those Who Reach the Major Leapes
For the 13.3% of drafted players who are able to advance to the majors during
their careers, a lifetime of fmancial security may be attained. This may not be true if
a player's big league experience lasts for only a very brief period, but if the player
spends a few seasons in the league and makes intelligent use of his salary, then his
money will generate tremendous returns.
In 1994, the minimum salary that could be paid to major leaguers was $109,000,

and the average player earned slightly over $1.1 million (Martin, 1994, p.12). A
short career earning the league minimum probably will not create a bank account
sufficient to support a family for life, but several seasons as one of the average
players in the majors could allow an athlete to invest and earn a substantial amount.
If an average major leaguer invested 23.9% of his salary at the T-bill rate each year

throughout a three year contract. at the end of the period. his earnings would be
FVl = 262,900 (1.0425) = $274,073.25

31
FV2 ;: [274,073.25

+ 262,900] (1.0425) = $559,794.61

FV3 == [559,794.61 + 262,900] (1.0425)

=

$8'7,6S9.13

This 23.9% of the salary placed in an S&P 500 type fund over three years will return
FYi = 262,900 (1.1106) = $291,976.74
FV2 = [291,976.74

+ 262,900] (1.1106) = $616,246.11

FV3 = [616,246.11

+ 262,900] (1.1106)

= $976,379.67

Based on these numbers alone, it is evident that a player talented and fortunate
enough to compete in the major leagues near the average level can have a nice sum of
money waiting for himself and his family when the baseball career runs its full
course. Ample opportunity for college or relaxation before beginning a new
occupation should be available to the player who has a decent major league career.
Unfortunately for most draftees, there exists upwards of an 87 % chance that this will
not be the case.

Recent Draftees Mating Their Own SigniDg Decisions
Discussing the scenarios facing baseball players drafted immediately following
high school would seem incomplete without the inclusion of a few cases in point. The
following four players were all faced with similar cil'almstances relating to their draft
position and the offers received from their drafting organizations. This section will

report each player's decision and his current career status.
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The first player whose situation will be addressed is outfielder Tony Sheffield.
As a 1992 second round draft choice out of Tullahoma, Tennessee, be was offered a

signing bonus of $162,000. After considering scholarship offers from Alabama, Ole
Miss, Tennessee, and Middle Tennessee, Sheffield decided that professional baseball
was the best choice for himself. Being a high draft pick. Sheffield was able to

negotiate a contract containing perfonnance incentives based on offensive statistics
including hits and stolen bases. He also received four years worth of college money
at a public school in the state of Tennessee. At the close of the 1995 season, Tony
was competing at the double A level.

A second player who was faced with the signing decision during the 1992 draft
was outfielder/first basemen Todd Helton, a Knoxville native. Also chosen in the
second round, Helton received an offer to sign for $450,000. Having already

accepted a football scholarship to the University of Tennessee, Helton had the
opportunity to compete in two intercollegiate sports during his schooling. This lure,
along with the fact that signing bonuses had been increasing for the few drafts prior to
1992, was enough to convince Helton to attend school and enter the draft again as a
college player. After completing a stellar career at Tennessee, Helton was selected in
the first round of the 1995 draft. After brief negotiations, a signing bonus of
$892,000 was agreed upon by Helton and the Colorado Rockies. The decision to
attend college proved to be the lucrative choice. Helton played high A ball in 1995.
A third player whose signing decision lends itself to this study is Kennie
Henderson, a pitcher from Ringgold, Georgia. Chosen in the first round of the 1991
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draft as a high school senior, Henderson was offered a signing bonus of $500,()()() as
an incentive to forego his scholarship to the University of Miami. Not being in

immediate fmancial need, Henderson decided to receive his education at Miami and
compete at the collegiate level until he could be drafted again. After experiencing
arm problems and difficulty in throwing strikes to opposing hitters, Henderson was

completely passed over in the 1994 draft and then chosen in the fifth round of the
1995 selection process. Even though Henderson lacks only one semester to graduate,
the fact that he signed for $35,000 makes his decision to attend college appear costly
from a financial standpoint. Henderson competed in high A baseball in 1995.
The final player whose signing decision will be addressed is Nashville pitcher R.

A. Dickey. Selected in the tenth round of the 1993 draft out of Montgomery Bell
Academy in Nashville, Dickey received an offer of $110,000 to sign a professional

contract. Being unsure of his decision, Dickey went on to discuss possible contract
clauses with his drafting organization. the Detroit Tigers. After a month of
deliberation, Dickey chose to accept his scholarship to the University of Tennessee.
During his career. Dickey bas been named national Freshman of the Year, has been a
member of numerous All-American teams, and has played for Team USA in 1994 and
1995. He will be eligible for the draft at the close of the 1996 season.
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Conclusions
Being a baseball player wbo is cbosen by a Major League organization in the
amateur draft is most definitely an exciting moment for all involved. The selection
represents an opportunity to move on to another level of competition while also
serving as a reward for excelling at a previous level. The fact still remains, though,
that not all drafted high school athletes are ready to play professionally. A college
career is a chance for those players to receive an education while maturing physically
and mentally. For some players, the decision of whether or not to sign a professional

contract immediately after high school is based on intensely personal factors which
are diffICUlt to quantify with any broad set of recommendations. These conditions
include such things as family wealth and personal intelligence. For other players
falling into the broader range of those not overtly wealthy, impoverished, or unable to
gain entrance into a college, it is possible to make a set of recommendations based on
the information included in the study.

Recommendations
Using the fmancial figures and statistics included in the study, a set of rough
recommendations for drafted players based on round of selection can be made.
They will not hold true in all cases due to each player having a differing set of
circumstances, but the suggestions could be used as general a guideline or a point of
reference for any draftee.
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The First Round Draft Choice
In the case of the 1996 fIrst round draft choice, the recommendation is simple:
negotiate and sign a contract. The most important numbers speak for themselves. As
seen in table 1 of the appendix, with an expected present value of $4,501,381 for
signing compared to an EPV of $1,654,654 for attending college, the $2,846,727
discrepancy in favor of the immediate signing of a contract is a powerful amount to
refuse for any player.
A second statistic in supporting the decision to sign is the first round pick's 79%
chance to fall to a later round when drafted again (Simpson, 1990, p. 20). This is
crucial because the 1996 fIrst round selection who attends college and is a 1999 fIrst
round pick should not expect to see the average bonus paid to fIrst rounders rise as it
did in the late 1980's and early 1990's. He would likely receive more money in
1999, but not an amount great enough to merit the risk he would be assuming by
allowing himself to be re-drafted. Looking at table 12 of the appendix shows that the
$878,38) signing bonus he receives now can generate quality returns if a decent
amount is properly invested.
A final reason that a fIrst round choice should sign is the situation facing him at
the end of his baseball career. Being a Imt round choice, a 63% chance that he will
reach the majors exists, but even if he does not achieve that goal, the cupboard will
not be bare. A guaranteed college education is a given in his contract, and if he has
invested any sizable portion of his signing bonus and salary, the returns will be
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sufficient enough to comfortably sustain the player and his family for a period while
the adjustment to life after baseball is made.

The Second ThroUJh Pifth Round Draft Choice
The situation facing the 1996 second through fifth round selection is not unlike
that of the first round pick. The recommendation, though not as set in stone, is again
to sign immediately. Referring again to table 1, it can be seen that the EPV of
signing out of high school is $2,478,848 for this draft category while the EPV of
pursuing a college education and baseball career is $1,547,430. The difference
between these two scenarios is still a substantial $931,418, and this sum is surely
enough to sway some players previously unable to decide which route to choose.
Even though the odds of reaching the majors from this draft category fall to 36 %,
the $231,000 average signing bonus is substantial enough to provide some financial
security to a player who falls short of the majors assuming that it is invested carefully.
Table 12 details some of these potential returns. College money will also be available
for the player willing to demand that it be included in his contract. These factors
combine to create a positive scenario for the player in the event that his career ends in
the minors. Some opportunity for draft advancement does exist for second through
fifth round draftees, and this will be a reason for a few to refrain from signing.

The Sixth Through Fifteenth Round Draft Choice
The player chosen in 1996 in the sixth through fifteenth rounds likely faces the
most difficult decision of all the draft categories. He lies in the middle of several
factors that should push him toward one option or the other. According to table 1, his
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EPY of signing immediately is $1,203,217, while his EPY of attending college is
slightly larger at $1,261,951. These numbers leave a difference of $58,734 in favor of
the education, but this is not an overwhelming sum.
The average signing bonus of $58, 162 is a large amount of money in the short
term to someone in financial difficulty, but only through frugality and shrewd investing
will it be sufficient to support a player and possibly his family for any period of time at
the close of his baseball career. The inability of this bonus amount to generate very
substantial returns can be seen in the amounts in table 12. This shows how the player,
although he likely will be able to bargain for the organization to fund a college
education, will find it difficult to earn a degree. Additionally, the player's chances of
reaching the majors have fallen to a mere 15 %•
For the rare player in this draft category who comes from a very wealthy
background and is able to negotiate successfully, the recommendation is to consider
both options. For most other players, especially those who are unable to bargain for

college money, the recommendation is that they take the education and try to be drafted
again in 1999. The negative number attained from the difference between the signing
EPY and the college EPY is not a promising factor for draftees in this category
thinking about signing. In the event that the baseball career fails, the threat of being a
member of the work force lacking a college degree should be enough to pressure these
draftees into attending school.
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The Sixteenth Through Thirtieth RoUDd Draft Choice
The player drafted in the sixteenth through thirtieth rounds of the 1996 draft has
more factors working against him than in his favor. Table 1 shows that the EPV of
signing for the player in this cross section of the draft is $80 1,3CY7 compared to an
EPV of $1,142,388 for going to college. It is evident that the gap of $341,081 in
favor of the education strongly suggests that be choose school over the quick profit.
Other negatives for this draft choice are his chance of playing baseball in the
majors (an unfavorable 7") and the signing bonus be can expect to be offered (about
$24,000). Even though this is a large amount of money, it likely will not last into a
multi-year minor league career. If this is the case, a player never reaching the majors
will find himself facing difficult circumstances should be have his own family at the
close of his career. To make matters more difficult, it is possible that the player will
not have a good chance to negotiate and earn his college money. This potential lack
of guaranteed college money coupled with the dearth of sufftcient funds capable of
supporting a retiring player for any period of time (unless he invests his entire bonus
at a tremendous rate) make the recommendation for all draftees in this classification to

attend college and attempt to be drafted again in the future.

The Thirty-Pint Through Fiftieth RoUDd Draft Choice
The player chosen in 1996 in one of the draft's ftnal twenty rounds faces a

situation similar to his predecessors in the sixteenth through thirtieth rounds, and that
situation creates an obvious logical decision. The ftrst reason is the comparison of
EPV's. As seen in table 1, the EPV of signing out of high school is $543,341 while
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the EPV of attending college is $1,078,101. A $534,670 balance supporting the
choice to attend school can be found between these two EPV·s.
Another problem is that this draftee· s signing bonus will be approximately
$14,000 on the average. Even investing this entire amount will not produce

substantial returns after four years. Also, this draftee will have a most difficult time
negotiating with his drafting organization for any items not included in the Uniform
Minor League Player Contract. When it is included that only 2 % of the these players
ever compete in the majors, it is most evident that the recommendation for all draftees
chosen in this division of the draft is to attend college and become eligible for the
draft at a later date.
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Appendix
Table 1

Round Drafted
Round 1

Sign
No majors
Majors

Rounds 2...

PV1
PV2

478,056.07
4.023,324.69

412,762.41
2,066,085.90

EPV

$4,501,381

$2,471,848

Round....1.
401.264.55
801,952.68

Rounds 11-30 Rounds 31..ao
429.448.81
371,858.02

441.541.88
101,798.85

'101,307

$543,341

906.902.26
267.505.88
87,543.01

956.119.90
98.725.34
87.543.01

990,557.55
0.00
87,543.01

$1,203,217

College
Same or higher pick PV3
Lower pick
PV4
PV5
Not drafted
EPV

Signing EPV College EPV

864,645.22
702,465.50
87,543.01

1.023,765.88
436.121.58
87,543.01

$1,154,854

$1,547.430

$1.261,951

$1,142,*

$1,071.101

$2,848,727

$931,418

($58,734)

($341,081)

($134,780,

2
Table 2

First Round Pick
Age

Signing

TIme

18

0

23

1
2
3
4
5

Signing Bonus =

878360.91

i =
g,d

=

0.07855
0.0425

Minor~9ues

IowA
middle A

high A
double A
triple A

2550
8175
7150
10075
12350
minors' sum

24

6
7
8
9

triple A
triple A
triple A
triple A
tlipieA
triple A
triple A
minors' sum at t=O

30

10
11
12

31

13 annual salary
sum of job at t=O

65

47 sum of all earnings
PV1

at t=C

2446.043185
5681.785507
6310.704589
8529.838337
10029.66989
32998.04149

No Majors (37%)
12350
12350
12350
12350
12350
12350
12350
56924.18369 majors' sum at t=0

Majora (63%)
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
5070170.353

Regular Job
28043 annual salary
323760.2848 sum of job at t-O

Regular Job
35053
40.4700.3557

1292043.42 sum of all earnings

8386229.681

478,016.07

4,023,324.6'

EPV of signing-

PV2

4,501,380.75

3
Table 3
College

Firat Round Pick
~e

18

0
0
0
0

0
1

2
3
After College
22
23

25

Age Time
18
0
1
2
3

Time

4 Bonus att=O
Minor Leagues
5
3300
10075
6
7
12350
12350
8
Sum att=O

26

12350
12350
12350
12350
12350
12350

9
10
11
12
13
14

743650.2793

22

2679.992765
7848.53633
9228.572153
8852.347389
28609.44884

23

32

Att=O

43737.91672

Regular Job
32;33 15;16
Att=O

65

47

44554
458189.1669

sum of earnings
sum of earnings
5787157.289
1274188.812
eamings * .37
earnings * .63
471449.1203
. I. 3645909.092
4117358.212
No majors
PY3
After College

No Majors (88%)
29
31

35

11
12
13
14
15
16

884,646.22

12350
12350
12350

17
Att=O

21091.58007

Regular Job

Regular Job
55892
539883.9506

0
0
0
0

4 Bonus at t=O
Minor Leagues
5
2850
7150
6
7
10075
8
10075
9
12350
10
12350
sum att=O

Majors (83%)

1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
4475013.611

0.07655
0.0425

After College

1st Round (21%)

28

No Majors (37%)

i=
g,d=

32;36 14;18
Att=O

65

47

44554
485663.6542

Later Pick (88%)

37195.17495
2314.539206
5569.920009
7528.57202
7221.651817
8491.460325
8145.285684
39271.43806

iMajors (11%)
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
4117581.778

Regular Job
55692
478408.8405

sum of earnings
sum of eamlngs
4672455.231
583221.8273
eamlngs* .11
earnings" .89
519067.4263
513970.0754
1033037.502
No majors+ma,jors
PY4

702,481.50

Not Drafted(11%)
Regular Job

23
65

5
47 sum of earnings
PV5

44554

795845.5434
87,543.01

EPY of school-

1,864,853.74
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Table 4
Rounds 2-&

Age

Signing

i==
g,d:

0.07655
0.0425

Time

18

o Signing bonus ==

1

IowA

2

middle A

23

3
4
5

high A
double A
triple A

24

6
7
8
9

30

10
11
12

triple A
triple A
triple A
triple A
triple A
triple A
triple A
Minors' sum at t==O

31

13 annual salary
sum of job at t=O

65

47 sum of all earnings

PVi

231258.76
MinorLeaguu
2550
6175
7150
10075
12350
Minors' sum at t==O

2446.043165
5681.785507
6310.704589
8529.838337
10029.88989
32998.04149

No MaJors (84%)
12350
12350
12350
12350
12350
12350
12350
56924.18369 majors' sum at t==O

"'~(38%)

Regular Job
28043 annual salary
323780.2846 sum of job at t==o

Regular Job
35053
404700.3557

644941.2698 sum of all eamlnga

412,762.41
EPV of Signing ==

PV2

2,478,848.32

1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
5070170.353

5739127.51

2,068,081·90

5
Table 5
College

Rounds 2-6
Age Time
18
0
1
2
3

0
0
0
0
After College

22

26

Age Time
18
0
1
2
3

4 Bonus at t=O
Minor Leagues
2850
5
7150
6
10075
7
12350
8
sum at teO

Rounds 101 (38%)
305363.2935

22

12350
12350
12350
12350
12350

2314.539206
5589.929009
7528.57202
8852.347389
24265.38762

37021.19249
Regular Job

32;34 14;16
Att=O
65

47

44554
485663.6542

1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
4475013.608

No Majors (93%)

sum of eamlngs sum of earnings
852313.5279
5344526.24
earnings· .&9
eamlngs • .41
2191255.758
502864.9814
No ma,Jors+ma;on
2694120.74
PV3

29

11
12
31
13
14
15
16
35
17
Att=O

1,023,786.88

Not Drafted (11%,
ftegularJob
44554
5
795845.5434
47 sum of earnings

12350
12350
12350

21091.56007
Regular Job

Regular Job
55692
539883.9506

0
0
0
0

4 Bonus at teO
Minor Leagues
2850
5
6
7150
7
10075
10075
8
9
12350
10
12350
sum at teO

No Majors (&9%) IMaJors (41%)
9
10
11
12
31
13
14
33
15
At teO

0.07655
0.0425

After College

28

27

1=
g,d=

32;36 14;18
Att=O
65

47

44554
485663.6542

Later pick (&1%)
22861.36997
2314.539206
5569.929009
7528.57202
7221.651817
8491.480325
8145.285684
39271.43806
Majors (7%)
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
4117581.778
Regular Job
55692
478406.8405

sum of earnings sum of eamings
588894.0223
4658127.427
eamlngs·
.07
earnings • .93
326068.9199
529071.4407
No majors+majon
855140.3606
PV4

43&,121.58

After Collage

23
65

PYS

87,543.01

EPV of school :;

1547430.476

e
Tablee
Signing

Rounds &-11

1=

g,dAge

Time

18

o Signing Bonus =

0.07655
0.0425

58162.19
Minor Leagues

24

1
2
3
4
5
6

IowA
middle A
high A
double A
triple A
triple A

2550
8175
7150
10075
12350
12350
minors' sum at taO

2446.043165
5881.785507
6310.704589
8529.838331
10029.66989
9620.78647
42618.82796

IMajors (15%)
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
4863412.761
47534.64126 majors' sum at taO

No Majors (11%)

25

30

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

triple A
triple A
triple A
triple A
triple A
triple A
minors' sum at t=O

12350
12350
12350
12350
12350
12350

Regular Job

31;32
65

13;14

sum of job at t=o

47 sum of an eamlnat
PV1

Regular Job

28043
323760.2846 sum of job at teO
472075.9438 sum of an eamlngs
401,264.11

EPV of signing -

PV2

1,203,217.23

35053
382091.4109
5346351.19
801,812."

7
Table 7
College

Rounds6-1S
Age Time
18
0
1
2
3

0
0
0
0
After College

22
23

27

Rounds 1·15 (53%,

4 Bonus at t=O
Minor leagues
5
2850
7150
6
10075
7
12350
8
12350
9
Sum att=O

No Majors (76")
28
31

34

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

12350
12350
12350
12350

Att=O

28858.59851

IRegular Job
32;35 14;17
Att=O

65

44ss.4

22

2314.539206
5569.929009
7528.57202
8852.347389
8491.460325
32756.84795

23

55692
508460.4496

906,102.28

After College

Not Drafted (11 %

sum of earnings

Regular Job
44554
795845.5434

5
PV5

17.U3.01

0
0
0
0

Later pick (36%)

28

4 Bonus att=O
Minor leagues
5
2550
6
6175
7
7150
10075
8
9
12350
10
12350
Sum att=O

Majors (24%)

sum of earnings
sum of earnings
4968889.414
882372.2142
47
earnings * .78
earnings * .24
1192533.459
518802.8828
No rnajors+majors
1711138.342
PV3

23

135093.1135

1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
4292579.003

0.07655
0.0425

After College

No

(M%)

29
30

11
12
13
14
15
16
35
17
Att=O

Regular Job

485663.6542

i=
O.d=

Age Time
18
0
1
2
3

12350
12350

14285.75019
Regular Job

31;36 13;18
Att=O

65

47

44554
514382.0426

15628.71378
2070.9035
4810.393235
5M2.857562
7221.651817
8491.460325
8145.285684
36082.55212
lMajors Col")

1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
4117581.778
Regular Job
55692
478406.8405

sum of eaminas sum of eamings
580379.0587
4647699.884
earnings * .04
eamin.* .M
185907.9954
557183.8963
743071.8917
No 1I..,vt.+meJOrs

PV..

EPV of school =

267,501.11

1,261,951.15

8

Table 8
RoundS 18-30

Age

Time
18

25
28
31

24060.37

IowA
middle A
high A
double A
triple A
triple A

Minor Leagues
2550
6175
7150
10075
12350
12350
minors' sum at t=O

5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

triple A
tI1p1eA
triple A
tI1p1eA

65

0.07655
0.0425

2446.043165
5881.785507
6310.704589
8529.838337
10029.66989
9820.78647
42618.82798

No Majors (93%)
12350
12350
12350
12350

Majors (7%)
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000

minors' sum at t=O

29;32

i=
g,d=

o Signing Bonus =
1
2
3
4

24

Signing

11;14 annual salary
sum of job at t=O
47 sum of all earnings

PV1

1100000
4863472.761

32696.6627
Regular Job
28043 annual salary
382397.0562 sum of job at 1=0

461772.9189 sum of all earnings

429,448.11

EPV of signing •

PV2

801,306.83

Regular Job
35053
382105.4531

5312257.412

371,118.02

9
Table 9
Rounds 16-30

Age Time
0
18
1
2
3

College

22
23

27

4 Bonus att=O
Minor Leagues
5
2850
7150
6
7
10075
12350
8
9
12350
sum att=O

No Majors (85%)
28

10
11
12
30
13
14
15
16
34
At tC()

12350
12350
12350
12350

28858.59851
Regular Job

31;35 13;17
Att-O
65

47

44554
514382.0428

Rounds 1-30 (74%.

22

2314.539206
5569.929009
7528.57202
8852.347389
8491.460325
32756.84795

23

After College

sum of earnings
PVS

No
29
30

1100000

35

4292579.003

(98%)

11
12
13
14
15

12350
12350

16
17
Att=O

Regular Job

14285.75005
Regular Job

31;36 13.18
Att=O

65

47

44554
514382.0426

12072.15532
2070.9035
4810.393235
5342.857562
7221.651817
8491.460325
8145.285684
36082.55212
MaJon(2%)

1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
4117581.n8
Regular Job

55692
478406.8405

sum of earnings
sum Of earnings
576822.5001
4844143.326
earnings * .11
earnings * .02
565286.0501
92882.88651
658168.9166
No m~ors~ors
PV4

88,725.34

EPV of school •

1,142,388.25

Not Drafted (11%)
ReaularJob

44554

5

28

1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000

916,119.to

Later Pick (15%)

4 Bonus at t=O
Minor Leagues
5
2550
6
6175
7
7150
8
10075
9
12350
10
12350
sum att=O

l~on(1I%)

55692
508460.4496

0
0
0
0
After Co....

n386.61132

sum of earnings sum of earnings
653384.1004
4911182.912
earnings * .85
earnings * .1S
555376.4853
7366n.4388
No majors+majon
1292053.922
PV3

23

Age Time
18
0
1
2
3

0
0
0
0
After College

0.07655
0.0425

i=
O,d=

795845.5434
87,643.01

10
Table 10
Rounds 31-10

Signing

i=
g,d=

0.07655
0.0425

Time

Age
18

0 Signing Bonus =

25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

IowA
middle A
high A
double A
double A
triple A
triple A

1...259 .... 1
Minor Leagues
2550
6175
7150
10075
10075
12350
12350
minors' sum at t=O
No~...

26
28

32

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

triple A
triple A
triple A

minors' sum at t=O

29;33

65

11;15 annual salary
sum of job at t=O
47 sum of all earnings
PV1

2446.G43165
5681.785507
6310.7G4589
8529.838337
8182.099124
9620.78647
9228.572153
"'9999.82935
I ..... r.

(98%)
12350
12350
12350

23896.&4219 majors' sum at t=O
Regular Job
28043 annual salary
352397.0562 sum of job at taO

450552.9378 sum of all earnings
441,141.88
EPV of signing.

PV2

543,340.73

(2%1
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
4665201.689

Regular Job
35053
360481.7684

5089942.695
101,798.85

11
Table 11
Rounds 31-50

i=

College

0.07655
0.0425

g,d=

IAge Time
18
0
1
2
3

Age

After College

22
23

27

18

0
0
0
0

4 Bonus at t=O
Minor Leagues
2850
5
7150
6
10075
7
12350
8
12350
9
Sum att=O

Drafted Again (8t%)

31

34

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Att=O

12350
12350
12350
12350

28858.59851

2314.539206
5589.929009
7528.57202
8852.347389
8491.460325
32758.84795

32;35 14;17
Att=O

65

47

1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
1100000
4292579.003
Regular JOb

Regular Job

44554
485663.6542

55692
508460.4496

sum of eamings sum of earnings
598603.9482
4885121.148
earning.· .88
earnings • .12
526771.4744
586214.5378
No majolS+majon
1112986.012
PV3

0
1
2
3

0
0
0
0
After College

51324.8475

No Majora (88%) IMajora (120/0,

28

Time

9901H7.11

23
65

Not Drafted (11

%,

5
47 sum of eamings

iRetular JOb
44554
795845.5434

pya

87,143.01

EPV of school.

1,078,100.56

~--

---------------------------------

Table 12

12

PctentialFourYear
Investment Retums
T-.bill rate ;:
S&P 500 rate ;:

First Round

After tax bonus ;:

550,393.49

4.575% of bonus 23.9% of bonus 50% of bonus

75% of bonus

At the T·bill rate

29,741.90

155,372.96

325,040.04

487,572.06

At the S&P 500

38,308.49

200,125.24

418,672.05

628,008.08

Rounds 2-5

After tax bonus ;:

158,635.11

4.575% of bonus 23.9% of bonus 50% of bonus

15% of bonus

At the T-bill rate

8,572.25

44.181.79

93,685.76

140,528.64

At the S&P 500

11,041.32

57,680.35

120,670.19

181.005.28

Rounds 6-15 After tax bonus ;:

44,863.91

4.575% of bonus 23.9% of bonus 50% of bonus

75% of bonus

At the T-bil1 rate

2.424.33

12,664.83

26,495.45

39.743.18

At the SIP 500

3.122.62

16,312.69

34,128.98

51.190.46

Rounds 16-30 After tax bonus ;:

20.359.47

4.575% of bonus 2.32% of bonus 50% of bonus

15% Of bonus

At the T-biIJ rate

1,100.18

557.90

12.023.77

18,035.66

At the SIP 500

1,417.06

718.60

15,486.99

23,230.49

Rounds 31-50 After tax bonus ;:

12,120.50

4.575% of bonus 50% of bonus

75% of bonus

At the T-bill rate

654.96

7,158.05

10,731.08

At the S&P 500

843.61

9,219.79

13,829.69

0.0425
0.1106

